Many developing countries around the world apply progressive water tariffs, often structured in the form of discretely increasing block tariffs (IBTs). These tariffs have been criticized in the welfare economic literature due to their perceived inefficiency: many of the prices charged under IBTs do not correspond to marginal costs and thus violate the principle of allocative efficiency. In this paper we explore an alternative interpretation of the widespread use of IBTs, in terms of social preferences and fairness considerations. For this, we rely on an extension of the Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt (1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817-868.) utility function, including inequality aversion, to which we add another parameter representing a reference for redistribution which reflects a societal preference to correct for income difference perceived as unfair. Additionally, the model includes a variable on household size, finding that, as poor households are on average larger, a simple IBT tariff disregarding household size may not be "fair".
Introduction
The pricing of water is often dominated by political and socio-economic influences, and it has often been criticized by economists for being "inefficient". Particularly controversial is a pricing scheme that is often observed in the water sector, especially in a developing context: increasing block tariffs (IBTs), where the marginal price for water increases with the amount of water consumed (Whittington 2003) . In general, these are discrete blocks, whereas the more general form, a continuous block tariff, is referred to as a "progressive" tariff. and Whittington (2003) stress the wide-spread use of IBTs in Asia, as well as in other regions, and criticize it (Griffin and Mjelde 2011) . As an alternative, they propose a "Uniform Price with Rebate" (UPR) which is a two-part tariff, where the volumetric charge is equal to marginal costs and a fixed monthly credit is subtracted from the bill. 1 Schoengold and Zilberman (2014) , however, derive conditions of the demand and supply side under which IBTs lead to efficiency, cost coverage, and a reduction of net income inequality. Monteiro and Roseta-Palma (2011) analyze under which conditions water scarcity can strengthen the efficacy of IBTs. The main criticism in the literature is that IBTs will not lead to a "socially efficient" outcome, mainly allocative efficiency, where prices should be equal (or at least strongly related) to marginal costs. Thus, the "second-best" literature derives welfare-optimal non-uniform prices from maximizing total consumer surplus subject to incentive compatibility constraints and a zero-profit condition; this leads to general Ramsey-rules, which are the opposite of IBTs. An example is Goldman, Leland, and Sibley (1984) who also consider income effects, and the optimal taxation reasoning initially developed by Mirrlees (1971 Mirrlees ( , 1976 : both argue that pricing schemes no longer have a Ramsey interpretation of minimizing the deviation from the first best allocation (marginal cost pricing) but rather have to provide for distributional purposes if income effects are taken into account. Mirrlees' optimal taxation scheme requires a decrease of the marginal rate for high incomes to be welfare optimal; Diamond and Saez (2011) summarize the debate on the marginal tax rates. Sharkey and Sibley (1993) develop optimal non-linear pricing schemes for an arbitrary number of customer types and general cost functions; the "benevolent" regulator can define welfare weights which vary over the set of customer types; in this case, the marginal price can be below marginal cost if welfare weights increase with consumer types (Sharkey and Sibley 1993, 228) . Cowen and Cowen (1998) propose a radical form of price differentiation, where the unregulated monopoly maximizes social surplus by maximizing producer rent at the expense of consumer surplus. This tariff, too, deviates largely from the range of IBTs observed in practice. Another criticism comes from Dahan and Nisan (2007) who insist on the unintended consequences of increasing block tariffs in urban water: since larger households, that are generally poorer, consume more water than smaller households, they are charged a higher price for water. This erodes the effectiveness of increasing block tariffs. Barde and Lehmann (2014) compare means-tested tariffs with increasing block tariffs (IBTs). The former makes the water price dependent on income, whereas the latter introduces a quantity-dependent price that increases with consumption. Means-tested tariffs require the observability of the income of water customers. IBTs construct their price blocks under the assumption that consumption and income are positively correlated. The efficacy of both tariffs in terms of targeting the subsidies to the poor is mixed according to their empirical analysis of data set for Lima, Peru.
On the other hand, the criticism of IBTs has been challenged, in turn, by authors insisting on the specifics of water as a subsistence good: the optimal exclusion of users, some argue, may not take into account the vital importance of water for survival and a decent life. Thus, Diakite, Semenov, and Thomas (2009) have developed welfare optimal non-uniform pricing schemes for the water supply in Côte d'Ivoire under the provision that poor households have access to a minimum volume of water for a volumetric price of zero and a fixed fee set according to their willingness to pay for this amount of water.
2 Their model is a supplemented application of nonlinear pricing developed by Wilson (1992) . This type of models dispenses with the usual incentive compatibility constraints introduced in the second best literature by developing the concept of a demand profile which is a disaggregated form of a demand function. 3 It is known from this literature and the literature of optimal taxation that optimal marginal tariff functions are often non-monotonic. Diakite, Semenov, and Thomas (2009) derive a quantity-dependent continuous marginal price function that exhibits quantity discounts leading to a minimum price. Beyond this point marginal prices increase up to a peak to decrease again to marginal costs. However, specific to the water sector, this pricing rule is neither transparent nor practical to handle, which reduces the chances of being accepted and implemented.
In this paper, we explore an interpretation of the widespread use of IBTs in the water sector, relying on recent advances in the theory of social preferences 4 and welfare considerations. The paper is not normative, but rather tries to explain why IBTs are widely used, and we explain this with an approach in terms of preferences that takes the well-being of others into account (other-regarding preferences). The main contribution of our paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that increasing block tariffs are really inefficient per se, as a large part of the literature contends. Approaching the issue through the lens of fairness considerations, we identify another interpretation of progressive or increasing block tariffs: it's perceived fairness which may assure its social acceptability and, hence, its enforceability. Today, we know from the theoretical and the experimental literature that fairness considerations contribute significantly to the social acceptance of tariffs, and to sustainable economic development altogether. Thus, it would not be surprising to find that water tariffs include a fairness component, and that this implies a different tariff structure. This paper, therefore, builds on models of fairness, such as proposed, among others, by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , to which we add a parameter for redistributional preference. We also refer to List's moral preference approach, 5 that belongs to the group of so-called impure altruism models. Altruistic behavior is activated by the warm glow it causes to those who comply to cooperative norms. Overall, issues of fairness and redistribution are not new in the literature, but they have not been broadly applied to the water sector thus far. The paper sets out a model developing on the recent literature on fairness and equality that -in addition -takes into account the specifics of the water sector, including the potentially important role of household size. Our approach is not normative, but positive: rather than to support or to criticize IBTs, we seek a possible explanation of a tariff structure that dominates the real world. Our finding indeed supports the idea that IBTs may express society's preference for redistribution that is absent from other explanations; however, we do not derive normative policy implications, e.g. in the sense that regulators should adopt these tariffs more strongly.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way: the next section sets up notions of social preferences and of "fair" tariffs, being based on utility functions with inequality aversion and redistributional preferences a la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . We first derive the case of two customers and examine what this might imply in terms of tariff setting. In doing so, we take into account the specifics of the water sector, where it is commonly agreed that consumers should receive a certain amount of water independently of income or marginal willingness to pay: the Stone-Geary utility function allocates a subsistence amount of water to each household. In a two household-two incomes setting, we find that IBTs can be interpreted as a solution that represents societal attitudes in terms of inequity aversion and redistributional preferences. Section 3 provides a generalization of this result, to the continuous case of progressive (water) tariffs. We find that the tariff function exhibits the relation between progressivity and the distributional preferences; if the distributional preferences of society are high, the tariff function is strongly progressive; if distributional preferences are fully absent, the tariff function is linear. The analytical model includes a feature that solves the information asymmetry between the price setting agency (regulator) and the consumers, through an incentive compatibility constraint; since this makes the analytics complicated, we provide some numerical examples to strengthen the intuition of the results. Section 4 then includes an extension of the model taking into account the household size. In most developing and emerging countries that use IBTs, one observes in fact an inverse relation between income and household size, 6 that is often ignored by the price setting agency. Fuente (2016) and Whittington et al. (2015) discuss this issue with respect to low-and medium-income countries, and Kenya, respectively. As poor households are on average larger, a simple IBT may not be "fair". Our model extension explicitly takes into account household size, and we find that this leads to a stronger progression of IBTs. The last section concludes on a methodological note on the importance of addressing allocative and distributional issues simultaneously.
Other-Regarding Preferences and Increasing Block Tari昀fs

Inequity Aversion
The very rational of increasing block tariffs is their alleged fairness. But the precise relation between fairness and the progressive structure of a tariff system is not as obvious as asserted. In the more applied literature, the mere progressive structure is identified with fairness and environmental awareness (see the critical review in ). The progressive tariff structure allegedly contributes to a desirable income redistribution. However, we know from the optimal tax literature that a fair income tax function that includes distributional goals is not necessarily progressive over the whole range of income. 7 Instead, optimality may prescribe declining marginal tax rates as income rises. This feature can also occur in the case of non-linear water tariffs, such as in Diakite, Semenov, and Thomas (2009) . These results are derived from a social planner's perspective, which does not account for the acceptability of tariff schemes. It is our contention that the construction of a tariff schedule has to take into account fairness consideration from the viewpoint of customers to assure its acceptability and, hence, its enforceability.
The theory of other-regarding preferences is helpful to derive some conditions which should be met by a fair and optimal tariff schedule. Other-regarding preferences not only take into account the utility derived from goods and services but also the distribution of consumption opportunities of other people. Individual well-being depends also on one's own endowment with goods in comparison to endowments of others. To capture the social nature of preferences, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have introduced an other-regarding utility function to explain the somewhat paradoxical results from experiments, e.g. the ultimatum game. We know from these experiments that people are willing to forgo utility if they can prevent a proposed allocation they judge as unfair. This willingness cannot be explained by the traditional utility theory but requires to include preferences of fairness into individual's utility function. There are also other contributors to the theory of social preferences, e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) . However, modeling inequity aversion requires to understand and to define what fairness means. The mere equity of material endowment or of well-being is only one special case. 8 In general, various income distributions, which are unequal, might be perceived as fair. This concept of "fair inequality" derives from liberal egalitarian theories of justice, which consider an unequal income distribution as fair if it is the result of personal effort and talents. The institutional framework must offer equal opportunities and personal freedom to all people, so as to guarantee the unrestricted conversion of talents and effort into income or well-being. 9 In the following, we want to utilize these concepts to derive a fair and, hence, acceptable water tariff system. To do so, we introduce a two stage approach.
-In the first stage, a water provider or a regulation authority sets a tariff system. This stage is also called constitutional phase because the regulation authority acts on behalf of the customers.
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-In the second stage, customers make their consumption decision solely on the basis of their own utility function. This does not contradict the other-regarding preference approach since the consumption decision is made under the knowledge that tariffs have been set in accordance to fairness aspects in the first stage.
The main difference to the usual approach of maximizing total social welfare given the consumption behavior of customers is that the regulator takes people's concern for fairness into account. To introduce the concept, we first confine the analysis to two customers. Later, we generalize the model to a continuous income distribution.
A Model with Inequity Aversion and Distributional Preferences
Consider two identical customers 1 and 2 who only differ with respect to their income 1 and 2 , respectively, where 1 . We assume that 1 is sufficiently high to allow customer 1 to purchase the subsistence level of water for a price not less than marginal costs. Otherwise the construction of the tariff system reduces to the task to construct a tariff system, such that the lower income class is able to have access to the subsistence level , whereas the upper income class faces a price well above average costs; in that case, the increasing block price structure is not the result of distributional considerations but ensues from the fulfillment of the principles of accessibility and cost coverage. The regulator introduces on behalf of customers a tariff system which consists of two outlay-quantity bundles
where is the water quantity offered for the amount of . This quantity of water refers to water consumption above the subsistence level . The utility of consumers depends on water consumption including the subsistence level and the consumption of other goods that are represented by a basket . In the following, a Stone-Geary-utility function is employed:
where and are the subsistence level of water and of other goods, respectively. It is assumed without loss of generality that = 0.
Since it is assumed that the water supplier always secures at least the subsistence level , we concentrate the analysis on water consumption in excess of the subsistence level
This transformation allows to utilize a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Utilizing the outlay-quantity-bundle and the budget constraint of customers, we can express the basket of other goods as = − . Thus, utility is
The subscript denotes consumer with income and the superscript refers to the outlay-quantity-bundle customer has chosen. Equation (5) specifies the material well-being of customers. However, this is only one component of the individual utility function of customers who also care about the distribution of well-being. To model the distributional concerns, we make use of the utility function introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Fehr and Schmidt have introduced a specification of utility functions that comprises an other-regarding component in addition to the material well-being. We resume this specification and modify and extend it, respectively:
where we assume 11 that customer chooses . Total utility of customer 1, for example, consists of the material well-being > Φ , then a disutility of disadvantageous inequality occurs. Customer 1 observes that the material well-being of consumer 2 is higher than the threshold value Φ. The intensity of disutility is expressed by the parameter > 0. However, if 2 2 − 1 1 < Φ consumer 1 feels a regret for being better off than consumer 2. The intensity of this regret is given by . If customers are strictly egalitarian 12 then Φ = 0, i.e. consumers consider a tariff system best that leads to an egalitarian distribution of material well-being. However, it could also be the case that consumers belief in an unequal distribution of well-being if it is the result, say, of effort and talent. We know from the literature that an unequal income distribution can be regarded as fair if it is based on responsibility factors, e.g. effort; in contrast, income inequalities are held unfair if they result from illegitimate power structures or other non-responsibility factors. 13 In the former case, the water tariff is not to contribute to redistribution, whereas in the latter case the outlay-quantity bundles could be designed so as to reduce the negative utility effects of an unfair income distribution. The exact value Φ provides the information of the respective distributional beliefs of the customers. To keep the model simple, we confine the analysis to the case of identical consumers, i.e. their beliefs are the same.
14 Since the distributional beliefs are of great importance, it is worthwhile to define Φ even more precisely. Let us assume that the given income distribution is regarded as fair. Thus, the only requirements on the tariff system are economic viability and efficiency (marginal cost pricing). This is the case for the well known two-part tariff of Coase (1946) :
where are fixed costs, are average variable costs and 2 are fixed costs due to the provision of the subsistence level of water. Assume that the cost function is given by
From eq. (9) it can be derived that the Coase tariff is economically viable.
To calculate the resulting utility distribution of customers for the given income distribution and the two-part tariff applied, insert eq. (8) into the Cobb-Douglas function eq. (5) and maximize it with respect to . This yields
By reinserting into eq. (4) we get the indirect utility functions
From eq. (11) the utility difference
can be calculated, which follows from introducing the two-part tariff of Coase. Obviously, utility is linear in income. If the given income distribution is regarded as fair, the utility difference Φ is also in accordance with the distributional beliefs of consumers. However, if the given income distribution is regarded as unfair, the distribution of utilities that results from the Coase tariff would also be unfair from the viewpoint of distributional beliefs. In this case, consumers would prefer a tariff system that leads to a utility difference that falls short of Φ so as to make up for the unfair income distribution. The precise magnitude of
depends on the distributional beliefs and the efficacy of other redistributing instruments, e.g., taxes or other fiscal levers. If public authorities responsible for tax collection do function effectively, then income would exhibit a fair distribution and, hence, Φ = Φ . If other redistributing instruments lack efficacy, the water tariff system might also overtake the additional task of income redistribution, leading to the tariff requirement Φ < Φ . But usually, redistributing measures imply efficiency losses. Therefore, the question remains whether customers can live with a certain degree of unfair utility distribution in exchange for more total welfare. This depends on the degree of inequity aversion customers possess, i.e. the values of and .
To derive the optimal tariff system we aggregate utility functions in eqs (6) and (7) consisting of material well-being and the other-regarding components, which yields the social welfare function SWF:
where Δ 1 = ( 1 + 2 ) and Δ 2 = ( 2 + 1 ). With respect to the weights of dissatisfaction we assume > . In the experimental literature 16 the distinction between self-interested types ( = = 0) and fair types is made.
Fair types have a preference for fairness and are prepared to give up own income to achieve fairness. These types exhibit values 17 of ≥ > 0.5. In the following, we restrict our analysis to customers of the fair type. As a result, it follows that Δ 1 > 1 and Δ 2 > 1, which implies that the aggregated effect of inequity aversions of both customers exceeds the direct utility effect of increased well-being at the expense of more inequity. 18 In this sense, both customers within the constitutional stage exhibit strong other-regarding preferences weighting distributional issues stronger than their own well-being.
The derivation of the optimal tariff system is achieved by maximizing eq. (14) subject to the budget constraint
and the incentive compatibility constraints 
where are defined in eq. (5). These constraints are required since customers are free to choose the outlay quantity bundles offered. Tariffs cannot directly be linked to income, either because income is not observable, or because the water price must solely be linked to the underlying good water.
Due to the kink of the SWF at 2 2 − 1 1 = Φ, the optimization procedure has to be split in two subcases. 19 First, SWP will be maximized subject to the constraints eqs (15), (16) and the additional constraint
In the second subcase, SWP will be maximized again subject to eqs (15), (16) and
where
. The optimal tariff system exhibits the following properties Lemma 1:
1. In the presence of inequity aversion and redistributional preferences, i.e. Φ < Φ , the optimal outlayquantity bundles = { , }, = 1, 2 exhibit the following properties:
where 1 ( , 1 ) = ( − )/ , = 1, 2 and 1 + 2 = + 2 . Φ is the utility difference regarded as fair that can be achieved such that the incentive compatibility constraints eq. (16) are just not binding. The optimal utility difference equals the difference Φ.
b. if Φ ≤ Φ < Φ then , = 1, 2 are such that the optimal utility difference equals the difference Φ, i.e. utility grows with income exactly according to the redistributional preferences. Φ is the fair utility difference that results from maximizing the SWP under the respective constraints assuming that the constraint eq. (17) is not binding.
c. if Φ < Φ the then , = 1, 2 are such that
e. the optimal utility difference exceeds the difference Φ, i.e there exist an optimal deviation from the fair utility distribution parameterized by Φ.
2. In the presence of inequity aversion and distributional neutrality, i.e. Φ = Φ , the optimal tariff system is a Coase-tariff. Utility grows in a linear manner with respect to income.
3.
2 2 − 1 1 < Φ is never optimal, i.e. the optimal tariff system is never redistributional to such an extent that the utility difference is less than the fair difference.
Proof see Appendix A.
The main result of lemma 1 is that for a broad range of distributional preferences the optimal tariff system ties the optimal utility difference to the utility difference Φ perceived as fair. If the income distribution is regarded as unfair, then the optimal tariff system should be constructed such that the resulting utility difference follows the fair utility difference Φ < Φ . Even efficiency losses are accepted to secure this distributional goal. This strong result derives from the distinctive inequity aversion (Δ > 1). Since the inequity aversion is strongly developed, the water allocation has to take place in such a way that the utility difference between the two customers corresponds exactly to the distributional beliefs (Φ). This maximizes the social welfare function introduced in eq. (14) . The resulting allocation rule differs significantly from the rule to equate the marginal rates of substitution across consumers. It is a result of the strong weighting of distributional issues compared to the criterion of solely maximizing total material well-being (the first two terms of the r.h.s. in eq. (14)). Both criterions are contained in the SWF (see eq. (14)). However, because of the strong weighting of the distribution criterion, there is a corner solution (lemma 1 (b)) that prevents the (usual) allocation rule derived from an utilitarian optimization under asymmetric information. The allocation rule is political and not based on economic reasoning in the utilitarian sense. 20 The results of lemma 1 also depend on the strength of distributional preferences. Figure 1 illustrates the interrelations. Let us assume that Φ lies between Φ and Φ , then the distributional goal can be achieved even without activating the incentive compatibility constraints eq. (16) . Hence, the distributional goal can be achieved without efficiency losses. If distributional preferences Φ are such that Φ ≤ Φ < Φ , then the optimal utility difference resulting from the adoption of the optimal tariff system is equal to the fair difference Φ. In contrast to the former interval, this can only be achieved at the expense of efficiency losses. If distributional preferences are very strong, such that Φ < Φ , then it is optimal to live with some unfair utility difference, i.e. If Φ is regarded as fair (distributional neutrality), the optimal outlay-quantity bundles are located at 1 and 2 , respectively. The efficiency of the Coase tariff follows from the property that both tariffs are calculated by equating the Coase-tariff 22 line = ( + 2 )/2 + with the efficiency lines . These lines show all − -combinations for which the marginal rate of substitution is equal to marginal costs, i.e.
The respective indifference curves at 1 and 1 indicate the utility levels of both income groups. If, however, Φ < Φ the indifference curve of consumer 1 (2) must be more towards the south east (north west) such that the incventive compatibility constraint 2 2 = 1 2 is exactly fulfilled. 23 It is interesting to observe that for this case the optimal tariff system is also efficient, i.e. the outlay-quantity bundles lie along the efficiency lines at 1 and 2 , respectively. At the same time they are incentive compatible. Efficiency and incentive compatibility apply because the tariff system fixes quantities, i.e. includes quantity rationing. Consumer 2 can switch from tariff 2 to tariff 1 , which is cheaper in terms of the cost coverage of total fixed costs (see the 1 -line in comparison to the Coase-TL-line in Figure 2 ). But she cannot gain more utility because consumption is constraint to 1 .
If Φ lies in the interval [Φ , Φ ) distributional preferences are strong, to an extent, that requires to accept efficiency losses. Figure 3 depicts this case. The optimal outlay-quantity bundles , = 1, 2, are designed such that the utility of income group 1 (2) does increase (decrease) in comparison to the utility levels in the Coase tariff case. Moreover, efficiency losses for income group 1 are observable whereas efficiency for income group 2 is maintained, which is a standard property of optimal price discrimination. 25 Notice that for this interval the optimal tariff system secures a utility difference that equals exactly the difference of well-being which is regarded as fair. Only in the case of extreme distributional preferences (case 1. (c) of the lemma) efficiency losses have grown to such an extent that it is optimal to deviate from the fair utility difference. These efficiency losses are the consequences of the need to separate both income groups by a system of incentive compatible outlay-quantity bundles. Assume for explanatory purposes that the distributional preferences are completely egalitarian, i.e. Φ = 0. From the incentive compatibility constraints eq. (16) and from the single crossing property 26 we can infer 2 2 > 1 1 . Hence, the optimal utility difference is higher than the well-being differential Φ regarded as fair. In the following, we exclude this case from the analysis assuming that the water tariff system is not mainly in charge of redistributional tasks. There are other redistributional instruments that stay in the center of distribution and social policy. Yet, this does not imply that the water sector does not contribute to the distributional goals to a certain extent.
The Continuous Model
In the following, the two-income-group model will be extended to the case of a continuous income distribution under the assumption that inequity aversion and distributional preferences are such that optimality leads to a tariff system that completely ties the optimal utility difference to the fair difference of utility Φ (cases 27 1. (a) and (b) of lemma 1). Thus, the parameters and representing inequity aversion do not need to be considered any more. They only play a role in case of a utility distribution considered unfair. After presenting the basic model, we turn to the fairness concept in case of a continuous income distribution and the resulting progressive tariff. Finally, a simple numerical example shows how material well-being and fairness relate to each other.
Incentive Compatibility
Like in the previous section, consumers choose between water and some other goods which are aggregated into a basket. Consumers differ with respect to income: we assume a continuum of incomes beginning with very poor households followed by a middle class and ended by rich customers. Income is distributed according to a density function ( ) > 0, ∀ ∈ = [ ,] . The total number of people of income is ( ), where is total number of customers. In the basic model, we assume that households differ only with respect to income. Later, we will include the household size in the analysis.
Similar to the discrete case laid out above, poor people are entitled to receive a certain amount of water for an affordable price; this is captured by the specific Stone-Geary-utility function eq. (2). In addition, the water tariff system is constructed such that water expenses depend on water consumption and income. This can be denoted by a tariff plan (TP)
where denotes income in the interval and ( ) is a continuous outlay function of customers to be determined subsequently. ( ) is the respective profile for water consumption. Note that the usual tariff system ( ) can be derived from eq. (21). The affordability of water supply requires that the poorest can buy their subsistence level of water. Hence, the TP is constructed such that ( ) = and ( ) =
eq. (22) secures that all customers have access to water, even if the poor cannot afford water priced by marginal costs, i.e. < . Taking the tariff plan TP into account, the budget constraint of households can be derived:
where is the price of the other good. For simplicity, we calibrate the measure of such that = 1. Similar to the two-income-group mode, we define
where is the water consumption in excess of the subsistence level and is income above the minimum and is distributed according to the density function ( ) = ( + ) > 0, ∀ ∈ = [0,̄− ]. Using eq. (24), the budget constraint can be transformed to
If we insert eq. (25) into eq. (2) we obtain
Like above, as water utilities cannot observe income (or are not allowed to ask for income details), the tariff system has to be constructed in a way that customers have an incentive to report their true income, i.e. the tariff system must be incentive compatible. From the revelation principle we know that incentive compatibility (IC) for the continuous case satisfies the following incentive constraint 28 :
Equation (27) requires that ( ) and ( ) are chosen such that customers do report their true income to the water company. The respective properties can further be inspected if we differentiate eq. (27) with respect toã nd set̃= .̇(
where dots denote the derivatives with respect to . Utilizing the Cobb-Douglas utility function yields:
Equation (29) implicitly determines some characteristics of the admissible tariff systems. From the second order conditions, 29 it also follows thaṫ(
We continue to assume the following simple cost function:
where are fixed costs, is a positive constant and
is the aggregated water consumption for all incomes up to .
Fairness in the Continuous Case
Lemma 1 showed that for a broad range of distributional preferences the optimal tariff system sets outlayquantity bundles such that the well-being of income classes develop according to Φ, the utility difference perceived as fair. The redistributional effects of these optimal bundles can be identified by observing that the resulting allocations improves the well-being of the lower income class in expense of a deterioration of wellbeing of the upper class. In this case, the parameters of inequity aversion do not appear because there is no deviation from the fair utility distribution. In the continuous case, the utility difference Φ perceived as fair has to be extended to a function Φ( ) for all in [0,̄− ], so as to determine the fair utility levels of income classes for the whole income range. If distributional neutrality prevails, we know from the preceding section that the utility of customers is a linear function of income (recall eq. (11)). Utilizing this utility function, we define
In the continuous case, the utility difference is transformed to an utility differential. Due to the linearity of the Coase-utility function the income elasticity is equal to one. People consider the linear dependence of well-being on income as fair. However, if customers exhibit distributional preferences, the fair growth of utility with respect to income cannot be linear. Instead, one obtains the following differential equation:
Equation (33) is a requirement that a fair tariff system must conform to. The tariff system must be constructed such that well-being rises with income in a degressive way. This can be achieved by introducing a parameter > 0 that bends away the utility increase in income from the linear path defined in eq. (32) . In the following, we assume that Φ( ) = (1 − ) is constant. This implies that distributional preferences do not change as income rises. The parameter indicates the strength of distributional preferences. 30 By inserting the incentive compatible tariff plan TP into the utility function eq. (26) and utilizing the IC condition in eq. (28), eq. (33) can be expressed as:
This fairness condition prescribes how income and expenses are related if distribution matters.
Progressive Tari昀fs
Having introduced the incentive compatibility constraint and the fairness condition, the next task is to derive the tariff system. From eq. (34) it follows
Differentiating ( ) and inserting into eq. (29) yieldṡ
This non-linear differential equation can be solved leading to
where S is a constant, which will be determined later. Notice that the solution is only valid if > . Otherwise, water consumption would decrease with income , which violates the incentive compatibility constraint (second order condition). In order to find the tariff function it is necessary to solve eq. (36) for and to insert the result into eq. (35). This yields the tariff function
Proposition 2:
If inequity aversion and distributional preferences ( > > 0) are such that the optimal utility function ( ) = ( ( ), − ( )), where { ( ), ( )} are defined in eqs (35) and (36) respectively, follows the fair growth of well-being defined in eq. (33) then the resulting optimal tariff function eq. (37) is progressive. In the case of distributional neutrality ( = 0) the tariff function is linear.
The proof follows from the outlay-quantity functions eqs (36) and (35).
The tariff function eq. (37) exhibits a clear relationship between progressivity and the distributional preferences. If > 0, then customers exhibit distributional preferences; as a result, the tariff function is progressive. If = 0, the tariff function is linear. This is in contrast to the pertinent literature on optimal tariffs, 31 where the marginal price can decrease as income rises for certain income intervals. If = 0, the tariff system guarantees the access to water by construction but it is not redistributive. Instead, it is a simple two-part tariff of the form ( ) = + ( ), ≥ , similar to what has been proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, 9) and Whittington (2003, 70) . Notice that the volumetric price of water is above marginal costs due to the affordability condition. does not cover + / . If this condition would be disregarded, the tariff could achieve marginal cost pricing. In both cases, the tariff function coincides with the optimal tariff function derived from an utilitarian social welfare function, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution of all customers are equated.
The optimality of the tariff function eq. (37) follows from lemma 1. If the social welfare function is the aggregation of individual social utility function of customers in the constitutional stage exhibiting unequity aversion such that Δ > 1, and if distributional preferences are not too strong, then the optimal growth of well-being with respect to income follows exactly the utility growth perceived as fair. This requires a progressive tariff function.
Numerical Example
Parameter Definition and Data
The tariff system { ( ), ( )} captures, water consumption, affordability and fairness. It remains to assure that the water provision under this tariff system is economically viable, i.e. covers the production costs. Utilizing eqs (30) and (31), cost coverage requires that
This condition allows to calculate from eq. (36) for various values of . In general, it is not possible to find an analytical solution. Therefore, we utilize a simple numerical example to show how cost coverage and distributional preferences are linked together. We draw the parameter values from the water sector of Sri Lanka. The specifications are determined with the help of basic data from Dharmaratna and Harris (2012) Figure 4 shows how depends on to guarantee the coverage of costs eq. (38) . The graph shows that at first increases due to the tightening of the progression forcing the upper income classes to more profit margin. As a result, water demand of low and medium incomes rises (see eq. (36)). This leads to higher costs and, simultaneously, requires more revenue. As progressivity rises, water demand of the high income class reduces, which leads to less revenue. Hence, after has reached the maximum it decreases. Cost coverage comes now increasingly from middle and low incomes. At approximately = 0.35 economic viability ceases, because the strong progessivity of the water tariff has lead to lower cross subsidies of the high incomes. At the same time, middle and low income cannot cover all costs including the subsistence level for all incomes.
Economic Viability
Threshold Income
Tightening the progression of the tariff function does not only lead to a greater contribution to profit margin of the upper classes; it also shifts the income threshold between lower incomes cross-subsidized and income ranges cross-subsidizing. Defining the income threshold as ∶ ( ) − ( ) = 0 and utilizing eqs (35) and (36), we can calculate the threshold for all admissible . This yields the following results, displayed in Figure The figure shows that for lower values of the income threshold increases, leading to a more expanded income band which is cross-subsidized. Starting from = 0, more progression allows to get more profit margin from the higher income range and, at the same time, more cross-subsidization for the lower incomes. This increases water demand and decreases water expenses of the lower income groups. In the course of increasing , more customers are subsidized by the upper incomes. However, due to the log-normal income distribution, there are not many upper incomes remaining and, as a result, a financing gap will occur, which has to be covered by an increased contribution of the middle incomes. Thus, in the course of further tightening, the threshold reaches a maximum and then decreases. At a certain threshold, will decrease such that the threshold income will decrease. Figure 5 shows that certain levels of can be achieved by both low and high distributional preferences. Obviously, a strong progression lowers the income range receiving cross-subsidization.
Material Well-Being
The extent of material well-being of the low income range depends, of course, on . Let us define low income as the sum of and half of average income , i.e. = + 0.5 [ ]. Inserting eqs (35) and (36) into eq. (26) yields
Total welfare of households with ∈ [0, 0.5 [ ]] can be derived by integrating eq. (39) with respect to over the relevant income interval. To compare material well-being of the lower incomes to total well-being, we also calculate the total integral of the range [0,̄− ]. Figure 6 shows both graphs as a function of . The figure shows that material well-being of low income groups is not a positive monotonic function of distributional preferences. There exists a value of which leads to the maximal material well-being of the low income range due to the economic viability constraint of water supply explained above; as increases further, the material well-being of the poor decreases. This is due to the fact that the threshold of redistribution moves to lower incomes, and that the lower income quartile starts to support the very poor.
Note that cannot be chosen by a regulator; is rather exogenous, as it represents the distributional preferences of a community of water customers. Lower aggregated material well-being does not imply lower welfare if we recall the strong satisfaction customers derive from the fulfillment of distributional preferences.
Increasing Block Tari昀fs with Water Scarcity
So far, we have not considered the problem of water scarcity. Often increasing block tariffs can be observed in regions characterized by water scarcity (see Monteiro and Roseta-Palma 2011) . Opinions regarding the ability of IBTs to allocate scarce water in a fair manner are divided. Many economists agree on the fact that IBTs should not be used as a matter of principle if water scarcity is present. According to some economists, however, there may be constellations which suggest the use of IBTs (Monteiro and Roseta-Palma 2011) . Other economists conclude that IBTs are always at a disadvantage to lower income groups compared to uniform rates. Griffin and Mjelde (2011), 116 conclude: In contrast to popularized opinion, increasing block rates do not place the welfare burden of conservation on large water users, nor do such rates favor low-income people in scarce-water circumstances.
We have seen in Section 3.4 that a strong progression goes to the detriment of the lower income groups, i.e. material well-being of the lower income groups decline with from a certain threshold on (see Figure 6) . Also, the range of cross-subsidized lower incomes decreases if the progression is too pronounced (see Figure  5 ). The question remains whether this property increases with water scarcity. This is combined with another problem that Griffin and Mjelde (2011) pointed out. In the course of increasing water scarcity, profits of water supplier rise (scarcity rent). But usually water is considered a publicly owned resource. This implies that the scarcity rent cannot be appropriated by the water supplier. Profits must be socialized, with various possibilities available. Either public authorities operate a wholesale market for scarce water, or the scarcity rents of the water suppliers are taxed away. In both cases, the public receipts are devoted for public purposes, e.g. infrastructure investments or it is directly redistributed to water customers. However, the redistribution can also be integrated directly into the tariff system. Thereby, it must be ensured that the redistribution of the scarcity rent to water consumers does not lead to an increase in demand violating the sustainability requirement of water use. In the following, we include the redistribution of scarcity rents in the tariff system and analyze whether the amended system can guarantee the protection of water resources and a fair allocation to poor income groups as well.
To include the direct redistribution of the scarcity rent to customers, we modify eq. (22) as follows:
( ) = , with ≤ 1 As a reference line we have taken the material well-being of the lower income group without scarcity (see Figure 6 ). Three negatively sloped lines are added, showing the effects water scarcity has on the material wellbeing of the lower quartile. The lines are drawn for three water supply constraint (̄= {1.5, 3, 5}). All three functions exhibit a negative slope, showing that an increased progression of the tariff function leads to less well-being regardless the extent of scarcity. 37 This outcome is in accordance to the results of Griffin and Mjelde (2011) . Linear tariffs ( = 0) are better for low income people compared to a progressive tariff structure ( > 0) in terms of material well-being. It is interesting to notice that scarcity can lead to more material well-being for the lower incomes. Since scarcity leads to scarcity rents, which have to be redistributed, poor consumers get through < 1 additional income leading to more well-being (see eq. (39)). Figure 7 also shows that there is no monotone relation between material well-being and scarcity. Increasing the scarcity from̄= 5 tō= 3 leads to higher well-being. A further increase from̄= 3 tō= 1.5 decreases well-being. This effect is due to the non-monotone relation between scarcity and scarcity rent, similar to the non-monotonic profit function of the Cournot-monopolist. Initially, increasing scarcity augments the scarcity rent leading to higher redistributive payments. From a critical threshold on a further decrease of water supply cuts the scarcity rent and, hence, reduces redistributive payments to customers.
Including the Household Size into the Tari昀f System
A major shortcoming of IBTs in practice is that they do not take into account the size of households. In the following, we explicitly introduce the number of household members into the tariff. 38 Two methods are conceivable: -The tariff is based on reported income and the reported number of household members. This requires a tariff schedule of the form ( , ℎ), ( , ℎ) , where is total household income and ℎ the household size. and are defined for households and not for individuals. This scheme is very difficult to design if there is no additional information available. It requires to solve partial differential equations. The resulting tariff schemes are sensitive with respect to the relevant parameters. Of course, if reliable information on income and household size is available, first best tariffs can be implemented.
39
-The tariff is based solely on reported income. This approach does not require households to report their size.
The number of household members is estimated utilizing econometric methods. The resulting size function depends on income and is included in the tariff scheme. The advantage of this approach lies in its simplicity, whereas on the contrary it lacks precision.The statistical relationship between household size and income is valid on average. Some households may have more members than others. This might lead to an unfair treatment of some households.
In the following, we take the second approach and include the household size function into the tariff system, assuming a deterministic relationship between income and household size. The size function is assumed as follows 40 :
The assumed negative correlation between income and household size is based on the hypothesis that the number of household members and household income are negatively correlated, e.g. Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2011) . Assuming that the household maximizes the aggregate welfare, the incentive compatibility constraint can be derived by applying eq. (27), i.e.
where ( ) is total water consumption in addition to ℎ( ) , and ( ) is total expenses for water. Households maximize aggregate utility by choosing the optimal message. If the tariff system ( ), ( ) is incentive compatiblẽ= . The first order condition requires:
The second order condition requireṡ( ) > 0 anḋ( ) > 0.
Utilizing the Cobb-Douglas utility function, eq. (47) can be expressed as:
The fairness of the tariff system follows from the fairness condition 41 eq. (33)
From eq. (49) one can derive the expense function
which differs from eq. (35) only with respect to the distribution parameter of the household size function. Differentiating eq. (50) with respect to and inserting into eq. (48) leads to the following differential equation:
which can be solved yielding
where is a constant chosen such that economic viability is achieved (cf. eq. (38)). 42 Finally, the tariff function for the case of multimember households can be derived by solving eq. (51) for and inserting into eq. (50). After some calculations, this yields
The curvature depends not only on distributional preferences but also on the household size function. If the negative correlation between household size and income is strong, then the progressivity of the tariff function is also strong. Even if distributional preferences are neutral ( = 0) the tariff function remains convex, i.e. it exhibits progressivity, if > 0. The level of the tariff function is determined by , which secures cost coverage.
Conclusions
Many developing countries around the world apply progressive water tariffs, often structured in the form of discretely increasing block tariffs (IBTs), but there is a controversial debate about the pros and cons of this approach. This paper addresses the empirical fact that many developing countries around the world apply progressive water tariffs, often structured in the form of discretely increasing block tariffs (IBTs). While traditionally, this has been justified by the need to assure a balanced budget for the water utility in a poverty context, where a subsistence level of water has to be allocated to each household below average costs, we explore an alternative explanation for the tariff structure, which is motivated by fairness considerations: developing upon a utility function including inequity aversion, we add a parameter for the "preference for redistribution", and calculate "optimal" fair prices set by a regulator. Thus, we find an alternative interpretation of increasing block tariffs than previously held. The paper also includes household size in the analysis, finding that as poor households are on average larger (in per capita terms), a simple IBT tariff disregarding household size may not be "fair" at all. More empirical work on Stone-Geary demand for water is necessary to underpin the theoretical findings, both for water-poor areas in developed countries, and in emerging and developing countries. Although the model is not directly applicable to any of these countries without knowledge of further specifics, and availability of data, it holds a general lesson for the understanding of water pricing in the context of poverty. Whether IBTs are used for fairness reasons, for rent-seeking reasons, or yet other motivations, has to be studied in each specific case. It emphasizes the role of perceived fairness for the derivation of optimal water tariff systems.
which is subject to the profit constraint eq. (15), constraint eq. (17) and the incentive compatibility constraints
and
where the are defined in eq. (5). Assuming an interior solution we have:
is the Lagrangian of the profits constraint eq. (15), the respective Lagrangian of the constraint eq. (17), relates to IC1 eqs (57) and to IC2 (58). Recall the definition Φ as the utility difference that prevails if both IC constraints are non-binding, IC1 > 0 and IC2=0 with = = 0. Inserting the respective derivatives of the Cobb-Douglas function in eq. (4), it follows from eqs (59), (60), (61) and (62):
In addition, IC2 = 0 (see eq. (58)) which applies to the profit constraint eq. (15) as well. This follows from eq. (62), i.e. > 0. From eqs (62), (58) and (15), { 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 } can be calculated and inserted into the utility functions, yielding the difference = 2 − 1 . If the distributional preferences are in the interval [Φ , Φ ), then we can infer from eq. (60) that > 0, which assures the result of 1 (a) of proposition 1: The optimal tariff system is such that the optimal difference of well-being is equal to the utility difference Φ regarded as fair. Figure 2 displays this case.
It remains to be shown that strengthening (reducing) Φ leads to an increase (decrease)
). This can be inferred from the coverage of fixed costs (see the t1-line in Figure 2 ).
Inserting eq. (63) into the Cobb-Douglas function leads to * = Γ( − ), = 1, 2
where Γ = ( / ) )(1 − ) (1− ) . Solving for yields
Starting from Φ , it follows from eq. (67) that a decrease of Φ cannot be achieved by a simultaneous increases (decrease) of both utilities with different speeds. In these cases, the profit constraint eq. (15) would be violated, since either 1 + 2 > + 2 or 1 + 2 < + 2 . The proof of 1. (b) is more extensive. Assume first that Φ is in the interval [Φ , Φ ) and = = 0. Then, by eq. (62) > 0, but this contradicts to the assumption. Hence, one of the two IC constraints must be binding. We show that the case > 0 and = 0 (case I) cannot be optimal. Instead, the case = 0 and > 0 (case II) is optimal.
43 . Assume, per absurdum, that case I is optimal. From the single crossing condition, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the IC constraints eqs (57) and (58) where the are defined in eq. (5) . Notice that the symbol refers to the utility in case I. Since > 0, it follows from eq. (62) that > Δ 1 − 1 > 0 . Therefore, we have 
If case II holds instead, then from the IC constraints eqs (57) and (58), and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions it follows that 
Since Φ ∈ [Φ , Φ ) we also have 
The resulting social welfare for both cases can be determined by inserting the respective utility functions into the SWF eq. (14) .
case II = 
i.e. costs are not covered. For the same reasons (see Figure 3) we must have 
Otherwise, i.e. 
is the Lagrangian of the profits constraint eq. (15), the respective Lagrangian of the constraint eq. (17), relates to IC1 eqs (57) and to IC2 (58). If = = 0 it follows from eq. (85) that > 0. Hence, eq. (18) is binding. If we assume that eq. (18) is not binding, we have from the Kuhn-Tucker-conditions = 0. This requires by eq. (85) that > 0 and = 0, which is case I. But this case is also in the second program not optimal. Since the proof is similar to the first program it is omitted. Since case I cannot occur and = = 0 implies > 0 , eq. (18) is binding which proves part 3 of the proposition. 
From eq. (87) the optimal messagẽcan be derived. A comparative static analysis yields:̃(̃,
wherẽ̃< 0 to secure sufficiency of the first order conditions and̃= 1 by construction of the incentive compatible functions ( ), ( ). Hence,̃(, ) = −̇> 0. Since < 0 it follows thaṫ> 0 and, hence, by eq. (87)̇> 0.
